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Recently, the educational initiative TED-Ed [1] has published a popular brain teaser coined the
“frog riddle”, which illustrates non-intuitive implications of conditional probabilities. In its intended
form, the frog riddle is a reformulation of the classic boy-girl paradox [2]. However, the authors
alter the narrative of the riddle in a form, that subtly changes the way information is conveyed. The
presented solution, unfortunately, does not take this point into full account, and as a consequence,
lacks consistency in the sense that different parts of the problem are treated on unequal footing.
We here review, how the mechanism of receiving information matters, and why this is exactly
the reason that such kind of problems challenge intuitive thinking. Subsequently, we present a
generalized solution, that accounts for the above difficulties, and preserves full logical consistency.
Eventually, the relation to the boy-girl paradox is discussed.
INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION OF THE
PROBLEM
The brain teaser presented in the educational video [1]
is the following: You find yourself lost in the jungle, and
even worse, poisoned by a mushroom. The only chance
to survive is to catch one of the frogs living in the jun-
gle, of which the female specimen produce an antidote.
On the other hand, while the male frogs have a distinct
croak, the females are mute, which makes them harder to
identify. Female and male frogs cannot be distinguished
from their appearance, and are equally numerous in the
jungle. Luckily, you spot a single frog sitting on a tree
stump in front of you. At that very moment, you hear a
single croak from behind. Turning around, you see two
frogs in a clearing. Apparently, at least one of the two
frogs (the one that just croaked) is male. As time is
running out, you quickly have to make a decision about
where to go, in order to catch a female frog and get the
antidote: should you go for the single frog, or for the two
frogs, of which at least one is a male? What are your
chances of survival in either direction? Importantly, we
assume, that going to the clearing with two frogs implies,
that you catch both the frogs there.
Let us first discuss the solution presented by TED. The
authors of the riddle [1] consider it intuitive to assume,
that the survival chance at the single frog, i.e. the chance
that this frog is female (f = ’female’), is Psingle(f) = 1/2.
This value is inferred from the fact that male (m=’male’)
and female frogs are found in equal numbers in the jungle.
On the other hand, the chance to find a female among
the two frogs is less intuitive, and TED suggests a sur-
vival chance of P (f|c) = Ptwo(f|c) = 2/3, given that we
heard a single croak (c=’croak’). For clarity, we drop the
label ’two’ in the following whenever we refer to the two
frogs, but denote the probability explicitly, when we refer
to the single frog. In order to obtain the above survival
chance of 2/3 at the two frogs, the authors of Ref. [1]
first consider the full sample space before the croak. The
two frogs could be mm = ’two males’, ff = ’two females’,
and mf or fm, which are ’one male and one female’. The
order is not important, but we choose to write mf and
fm separately, such that all the four events mm, ff, mf,
and fm are equally likely. In this notation, one may as-
sociate the label with the positions of the frogs, so mf =
’left frog male and right frog female’. As one of the two
frogs croaks, this rules out the possibility of two females,
because only males can croak. The equally likely events
mm, fm, and fm remain, of which two out of three con-
tain a female. Thus, the chance to find a female among
both frogs is P (f|c) = 2/3.
The above argumentation turns out to be problematic,
and gives rise to ambiguities, once the riddle is treated
properly by means of conditional probabilities. We cal-
culate the probability P (f|c), which is the probability of
at least one female, given that a croak was heard. As the
opposite of ’at least one female’ is ’no female’, we find
P (f|c) = 1 − P (mm|c). We can use Bayes’ theorem to
obtain
P (f|c) = 1− P (c|mm)P (mm)
P (c)
= 1− 1 · 1/4
3/4
= 2/3. (1)
We note, that unlike the chance P (mm) = 1/4, the two
probabilities P (c|mm) and P (c) are not given by the nar-
rative of the riddle. In order to find the presented val-
ues, the authors of Ref. [1] implicitly use a rule, which
we could phrase as: ’A male frog always croaks, but if
there are two males, there will also be only one croak.’
Only with this rule, one finds P (c|mm) = P (c|mf) =
P (c|fm) = 1 and P (c) = 3/4. This point is illustrated in
the tree diagram of Fig. 1.
Although the implicit rule mentioned above appears to
be a natural approach to simplify the problem, it needs
to be taken with care. First of all, one may wonder the
following. If the two frogs behave all the same – mean-
ing that we neglect any implications of two frogs sitting
next to each other, such as that, for instance, a male
frog croaks more often in the vicinity of a female – why
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2FIG. 1. (color online) Probability tree that follows the argu-
mentation of Ref. [1]: If at least one male exists, there will be
exactly one croak (c, yellow). From the three paths that lead
to a croaking event, two entail the occurance of a female frog
(f, green), resulting in a survival chance of 2/3.
should two males croak as likely as a just one male? But
more importantly, if males always croak, the single frog
on the tree trunk must be a female, as it did not give a
croak. Then, the survival chance at the single croak was
not 1/2, but trivially Psingle(f |c¯) = 1, where c¯ denotes
the absence of a croak. Therefore, the authors of Ref. [1]
apparently solve their riddle in an inconsistent way, as
they do not apply the mentioned rule to the single frog.
These problems arise, because TED wants to pass to us
the information ’at least one of the two frogs is male’,
or in other words ’not ff’, by introducing an ill-suited
croaking mechanism. As pointed out already in the com-
ments of Ref. [1], an alternative rule, such as for instance
’if there are two females next to each other, they start
fighting’, was sufficient to avoid such difficulties.
We here try to solve the frog riddle in its original de-
scription, in a logically consistent way, with as few as
possible extra assumptions. To do so, we define a prob-
ability for a male frog to remain silent during the short
time of our observation. Eventually, we can study the
chance of survival in the two limits of very rare or very
frequent croaking, in order to estimate a conclusive an-
swer. Treating the frog riddle this way, we review some
of the fundamental aspects of probability theory, that
challenge intuition: Are the sexes of the two frogs inde-
pendent after a croak? Is the labeling important? How is
the information ’no ff’ received, and do the events of the
initial sample space remain equally likely after obtaining
this information? In the context of these questions, we
further demonstrate how to map the frog riddle onto the
classic boy-girl paradox.
HIDDEN CORRELATIONS
First of all, let us discuss why an intuitive assumption
of independent frogs, which simply leads to a survival
chance of 1/2 for the two frogs, is not applicable in the
riddle. To visualize this point, let us assume for the mo-
FIG. 2. (color online) Probability tree for a scenario where
the croaking frog was spotted at the left hand side (l, yellow).
Again, the chance to find a female frog (f, green) evaluates to
2/3. Importantly, seeing the left frog croak is twice as likely
in mf as in mm, because in mm the right frog could have
croaked as well.
ment, that we knew which of the two frogs croaked (as
we see below, this in fact does not change the odds).
If all frogs remained uncorrelated after the croak, and,
for example, the left frog croaked, we could rule out the
two events ff and fm, such that we are left with mm and
nf. Given that these two samples are equiprobable, we
end up with a chance of 1/2, that the right frog is female.
Equivalently, we could argue, that the frog that remains
silent, is uncorrelated to the croaking one, such that its
sex should be male or female with equal chances, i.e. 1/2.
Both these arguments are not applicable for the given
problem. This becomes apparent, when comparing the
above chance with the discussion of the previous section:
Of two poisoned persons in the jungle, one being blind-
folded and the other one able to see the croaking frog,
the seeing person would end up with a different chance
of survival (1/2 < 2/3) than the other person. However,
as both persons, by rule, catch both frogs, identifying the
croaking frog cannot change the odds.
The origin of this alleged paradox is, that the two frogs
are no longer independent after the croak. In fact, the
two remaining events mf and mm (given that we saw the
left frog croak), are not equally likely after the croak.
Here, our intuition is misguided by the peculiar croaking
mechanism in the riddle. The authors generally allow
only for one single croak, meaning that in case of two
males mm, both could have croaked with an equal chance.
Given that we saw the left (l = ’left ’) frog croak, we find
the survival chance
P (mf|l) = P (l|mf)P (mf)
P (l)
=
1 · 1/4
3/8
= 2/3. (2)
The probability tree in Fig. 2 describes this situation and
gives the probabilities used in the above equation. Once
the left frog revealed its sex by a croak, the sex of the
right frog is no longer independent, and the second (right)
frog is more likely to be female than male, because if it
was male, it could have croaked instead.
3Let us give a brief example of when the argument of
independent frogs would be correct. Imagine, that male
frogs could only be stimulated to croak, if they get tick-
led. In that case, if we choose one of the two frogs (in
an arbitrary way) and tickle it, and subsequently it pro-
duces a croak, we know that it is male. The other frog,
however, is still completely independent of the first frog,
as there was never a chance for it to give a croak. As a
consequence, its chance to be female is simply 1/2 instead
of 2/3.
Finally, we argue by a rearrangement of the sample
space, that it does not change the odds, if we identify
which of the two frogs has croaked. This is based on the
fact that, by definition, we are allowed to catch both the
frogs in the clearing in order to find the antidote. Cru-
cially, we need to be careful in comparing the respective
sample spaces after the croak. In case we can not see the
croaking frogs, we use the three equally likely events mm,
mf, and fm (see first section). Seeing for instance the left
frog croak, we conclude, that only the two events mm
and mf are possible, however, with non-equal probabili-
ties (see the above calculation). This apparent discrep-
ancy between the two approaches is only due to the fact,
that in the above labeling, our mind associates the first
letter with the left frog. Using a different labeling, we
can map both scenarios onto the same, rearranged sam-
ple space. To do so, let us now define for the moment,
that the first letter of the labeling (write it uppercase)
represents the frog we heard croaking, no matter whether
or not we know, if it sits to the left or right hand side.
As only male frogs can croak, the samle space is for both
cases {Mf,Mm}. Again, Mf and Mm are no equally likely
events, and the chance to find a female is 2/3, irrelevant
of whether we saw the croaking frog or not.
SOLUTION OF THE FROG RIDDLE
We now tackle the frog riddle without making use of
the implicit rule ’male frogs always croak, but if there
are two males, only one croaks’, that leads us to logical
inconsistencies, as we have seen above. Instead, we con-
sider the following reasoning a natural interpretation of
the narrative of the riddle. Each male frog croaks indi-
vidually, and hence, in case of two males, more than one
croak is allowed. In fact, let us denote the chance for
each male frog to croak k times by pk. Explicitly, p0 is
the probability for a male frog to remain silent, and p1
the chance to croak exactly once.
According to the riddle, we now hear exactly one croak,
coming from the clearing with two frogs. First, we cal-
culate the chance of the event c = ’exactly one croak ’.
While for the sample ff, no croak is possible, both mf and
fm produce a croak with a chance p1. Two males, how-
ever, croak exactly one time with the probability 2p1p0,
where the factor of two arises because it does not matter
FIG. 3. Probability tree depicting a croaking mechanism,
where all male frogs croak individually. For simplicity, we
show only branches which result in a single croak c. A male
frog m croaks with probability p1 exactly one time, and re-
mains silent with probability p0. For the sample mm, one frog
has to croak while the other must remain silent, in order to
produce exactly one croak.
which of the two frogs croaks and which remains silent.
With that, we find
P (c) = 1/4 · (p1 + p1 + 2p1p0) = 1/4 · 2p1(1 + p0). (3)
The survival chance, which is the probability of finding
a female frog, therefore is
P (f|c) = 1− P (mm|c) = 1− P (mm)P (c|mm)
P (c)
= 1− 1/4 · 2p1p0
1/4 · 2p1(1 + p0) =
1
1 + p0
. (4)
The corresponding probabilities are illustrated in Fig. 3.
Let us briefly interpret this result for possible values of
0 < p0 < 1. If a male frog is likely to remain silent, p0 →
1, the survival chance approaches 1/2. This becomes
more intuitive, if we realize, that in this limit male and
female frogs almost behave identically. As the second frog
did not croak, and thus, we did not receive information
about it, it could be female or male with equal chances.
On the other hand, if croaking is a very likely event,
p0 → 0, the survival chance approaches one. This makes
sense, because then we have to conclude, that one of the
two frogs is female - it would have croaked otherwise.
The survival chance for the two frogs is always greater
or equal to 1/2. Should we therefore forget about the
single frog, and catch the two frogs? Not necessarily,
because as the single frog did not croak, it also passed
information to us. Our survival chance at the single frog,
given that it did not croak (c¯ = ’no croak ’), is
Psingle(f|c¯) = Psingle(c¯|f)Psingle(f)
Psingle(c¯)
=
1 · 1/2
1/2(1 + p0)
=
1
1 + p0
. (5)
Therefore, we find the same survival chance in either
direction. Clearly, the single frog does not necessarily
4have a chance of 1/2 to be female: As croaking becomes
more likely (p0 decreases), we have to be more skeptical
about whether the frog is really a male, if it remains
mute.
Why does the survival chance actually depend only on
p0 but not on the chances of croaking one or multiple
times? This is because the croaking frog already iden-
tified itself as a male. It does not matter, how likely it
would have croaked a second or a third time, we have
already obtained the information that this frog does not
provide the antidote. In fact, the important information
we receive is not the croaking event, but the absence of
a croak from the second, or the single frog. As we search
a female frog, and females do not croak, the key param-
eter is p0, which is the chance that a frog remains silent
although it is male. Note that it is therefore not im-
portant, what kind of statistical distribution (such as a
Poisson distribution) we assume to model multiple croak-
ing – the explicit chances pk with k ≥ 1 do not enter into
the calculation.
The finding, that the chances are the same for the two
frogs in the clearing, and for the single frog on the tree
trunk, does not rely on the introduction of the above
parameters pk, but holds generally as long as each frog
behaves independent from the others. To see this, let us
handle the three frogs in a common sample space. Sim-
ilar to before, let us now refer with the first (uppercase)
letter to the sex of the frog we heard croaking, with the
second letter to the other frog in the clearing (that re-
mained silent), and with the last letter to the single frog
on the tree stump. We can then write the full sample
space as {Mmm,Mmf,Mfm,Mff}. The frog that croaked
is identified as a male M. For the two remaining frogs,
both sexes are possible. Note that these four events are
not all equally likely. However, as each frog croaks indi-
vidually, the elements Mmf and Mfm are equiprobable (3
frogs, of which 2 are male, produce one croak). There-
fore, the presented sample space is symmetric under per-
mutation of the second and the third letter. From this
observation we infer, that even without the introduction
of chances pk, the survival chance must be the same in
both directions. This holds generally, as long as all the
frogs are treated on equal footing, and we are allowed to
catch both frogs on the clearing. Note that the former
was not given in the solution presented by TED.
We therefore suggest, that the solution to the riddle
– which way should you go? – should be phrased the
following way: It does not matter – in both directions
there is the same chance of survival. The actual prob-
ability of finding an antidote is given by Eq. (4), and
depends on how likely it is, that male frogs pretend to be
female by remaining silent. One could make a point for
the assmumption that hearing a croak is quite unlikely in
a very short observation time of the poisoned person. In
this limit, p0 → 1, the survival chances in either direction
are about 1/2. Interestingly, if we assume (somewhat ar-
bitrarily) that p0 = 1/2, we obtain the same value as the
authors of Ref. [1], which is 2/3 – however, with a com-
pletely different approach and in both directions (tree
stump and clearing).
THE BOY-GIRL PARADOX
For problems like the above frog riddle, intuitive think-
ing usually fails to recognize statistical correlations, that
are associated with conditional probabilities. This point
has already been convincingly demonstrated by M. Gard-
ner, who originally presented the ”boy-girl paradox” in
the “Scientific American” [2]. In a simple form, it illus-
trates the importance of the way information is obtained.
Up to now, the boy-girl problem has been subject to nu-
merous reformulations and reinterpretations (e.g. [7]).
As we explain below, the frog riddle can be viewed as a
modified version of the latter.
The original paradox has two main variations:
• Mr. Smith has two children. The older child is
a boy. What are the odds that both children are
boys?
• Mr. Smith has two children. At least one of them
is a boy. What are the odds that both children are
boys?
Throughout, we assume, that the probability for any in-
dividual child to be a boy or a girl is about 1/2. The
answer to the first question then is simply 1/2, since for
the younger child there is an equal chance of being male
or female. Because of the distinction “the older” and
“the younger”, we have a knob to discriminate between
the two children, and both become independent of each
other. The answer to the second question is more tricky
and, as it turns out [3, 4], depends on how the informa-
tion “at least one of them is a boy” is actually obtained.
Let us first assume that we meet Mr. Smith, and he
tells us, that at least one of his two children was a boy.
In this case, the children remain indistinguishable to us.
Our original sample space (before Mr. Smith talks to us)
was {BB, BG, GB, GG}, all being equally likely with a
chance of 1/4. Learning that one of the children is a boy,
rules out the sample GG, such that we remain with the
equally likely possibilities {BB, BG, GB}, and the chance
of two boys is 1/3. This is exactly the intended version
of the frog riddle, leading to the 2/3 chance of a girl (or
female frog), see Eq. (1) and Fig. (1). Importantly, no
logical inconsistencies can occur here, in contrast to what
happens in the frog riddle (see above).
Next, we modify the scenario: We meet Mr. Smith on
the street with a boy, that he introduces as his son. In
this case, the chance for a second son is
P (BB|Bm) = P (Bm|BB)P (BB)
P (Bm)
=
1 · 1/4
1/2
= 1/2. (6)
5FIG. 4. (color online) Probability tree for a scenario, where
Mr. Smith randomly picks one of his two children for a walk.
If a boy is chosen (Bm, yellow), the chance for the second
child to be a girl (G, green) is 1/2.
Here, the index m denotes the event of meeting a child,
and P (Bm) = 1/2 is the chance that Mr. Smith chose his
boy for his walk. Our odds have now increased from 1/3
to 1/2. How is that possible since we seemingly obtained
the same information? Let us consider the diagram 4:
As we can see, the chance of meeting a boy, given that
Mr. Smith has a boy and a girl, is 1/2, assuming that
Mr. Smith randomly picks one of his children for the
walk. As the gender of the child does not affect the choice
of Mr. Smith, one can argue by means of independent
samples: As the gender of the second child is independent
of the gender of the child we met, the chances for a boy
(or girl) for the second child are 1/2.
A different way of approaching the problem is to note,
that the sample space after we met a boy, which is
{BB,BG,GB}, does not consist of equally likely events.
The event BB is as likely as BG and GB together, after
we met the boy, cf. Fig. 4. The difference to the for-
mer situation is, that the two children can be labeled
by m = ’child we met ’ and h = ’child at home’. With
these indices, the sample space can be written in terms
of equally likely events, {BmBh, BhBm, BmGh, BhGm,
GmBh, GhBm, GmGh, GhGm}. With this notation, we
effectively compensated for the greater probability of
P (Bm|BB), by explicitly writing BmBh and BhBm. The
condition that we met a boy, reduces the sample space to
{BmBh,BhBm,BmGh,GhBm}. Two of the four samples
of the sample space contain two boys, leaving us with a
chance of 1/2, that the child at home is a boy as well.
Indeed, any situation that allows us to differentiate be-
tween the two children in a meaningful way, will change
the sample space, and thus the odds. For the same rea-
son, for instance, a little boy who is about to get a baby
sibling, can not predict the gender of the baby from fact
that he is a boy [4, 7]. The other baby has a fifty per-
cent chance of being a brother or a sister, since the two
children (born and unborn) are clearly independent, and
hence, distinguishable.
Meeting the boy in the street is therefore very simi-
lar to the statement “the older child is a boy”, since we
can simply replace the label “older” by “in the street”.
This analogy gets even more clear when we notice that
the probability remains 1/2, if we meet Mr. Smith with
a boy that he introduces as his oldest child. In this case
“the oldest child” does not provide us with relevant fur-
ther information, since we have already labeled the two
children by the encounter of one child in the street [4].
Importantly though, the labeling is not performed by us
seeing the son, but by Mr. Smith randomly picking one
child for the walk. This is analogous to the previously
mentioned case of randomly selecting one frog, and subse-
quently stimulating it to croak (for instance by tickling).
As we already discussed in the previous section, the
sexes of the frogs are not independent in the intended
version of the frog riddle in Ref. [1]. This is because the
authors there use the assumption, that only one croak is
allowed at maximum, and as a consequence, a possible
second croak from a second male is suppressed. There-
fore, even though we can distinguish the two frogs by the
label ’the one that croaked’ and ’the one that remained
silent’, the authors find a chance for a female frog that is
different from 1/2.
Let us emphasize the importance of the selection
mechanism with the following example. Imagine that
Mr. Smith belongs to a culture where girls never join for
walks with their parents. With such a biased selection
mechanism, seeing Mr. Smith with a son then does not
give us any information beyond the fact that he has ’at
least one boy’. The chance for the other child to be a girl
is therefore again 1/3. Why does the previous analysis
with a distinction of the child at home and the child on
the walk not apply here? In both cases, BG and GB,
the labels m = ’met’ and h = ’home’ are meaningless,
as the gender already determines which child will accom-
pany Mr. Smith. Distinguishing BB in the form of BmBh
and BhBm is in principle possible, but does not result
in a sample space of equally likely events. This sample
space is in fact given by {BB,BG,GB}, in which one out
of three contains a second boy. This scenario also cor-
responds to the intended version of the frog riddle, see
Fig. 1. There, one male is randomly selected (but never
a female) and reveals its sex by a croak. The female frogs
never could have revealed themselves, just like here we
can not meet Mr. Smith’s girls on the street.
The above analysis illustrates how the way information
is received affects the conditional probabilities of the boy-
girl problem. It is furthermore insightful to investigate,
how additional information, for instance about further
attributes of Mr. Smith’s children, alters the odds. This
is shown to correspond to the frog riddle under the as-
sumption, that male frogs croak at a given chance. Simi-
lar to the probability of a croak in the latter, the chance
of occurrence of the attribute is essential in the boy-girl
paradox. An example, that has been discussed exhaus-
tively in the literature [5, 6], is the one of Mr. Smith (of
whom we know by now that he has two children) let-
6ting us know, that he has at least one boy who was born
on a Tuesday. To make a connection to the frog riddle,
let us here study a slightly modified version of this sce-
nario. Assume that we meet Mr. Smith with a boy in the
street. At this point, since we can label the boy by ’the
boy we met’, and under the assumption that Mr. Smith
randomly selects a child to go with him for a walk, there
is a chance of 1/2 that the other child (at home) is a
girl (see above). However, as we greet Mr. Smith, the
boy happens to inform us: ’I am the only boy in my
family who was born on a Tuesday’. How have the odds
changed, now that we have obtained this information?
Importantly, the two attributes have to be considered a
logical conjunction – the other child can still be a boy, or
could be born on Tuesday, but not both.
We denote the chance for being born on a Tuesday by
p1 = 1/7, and to be born on any other day of the week
by p0 = 1− p1. The probability that Mr. Smith has an-
other daughter then is again given by Eq. (4), so it reads
P (G|c) = 1/(1 + p0), where compared to the frog riddle,
the croaking event c is replaced by the event c = ’boy
met who was born on a Tuesday ’. Explicitly, the chance
for a second girl yields approximately P (G|c) = 0.54.
The effect on the probability becomes more intuitive in
following limits: Had the boy said, that he was the only
child that is male and born on new years eve, p1 = 1/365,
we would end up with a chance of P (G|c) = 0.5007 to
find a girl. As being born on new years eve is a very rare
event, the information that he is the only child with this
feature is almost not affecting the odds. For the other
child, both the options of a boy not born on new years
eve, and of a girl born on any day, are almost equally
likely. On the other hand, if the boy tells us that he is
the only child in the family that is male and born not
on new years eve, p1 = 364/365, the probability to find a
girl evaluates to P (G|c) = 0.997. Because not being born
on new years eve is in turn a very common attribute, it
is very likely that the other child is a girl – after all, it
needs to comply with one of the two constraint ’female
born on any day’ or ’boy being born on new years eve’.
CONCLUSION
We have reviewed how information, and the way in-
formation is obtained (events that transpire in different
ways), can affect the probabilities of samples in the sam-
ple space. In many cases, this makes the assessment of
chances challenging for our intuition, as we generally tend
to disregard statistical correlations between different out-
comes. In both the frog riddle and the boy-girl problem,
for example, the actual mechanism of transferring infor-
mation is essential. The frog riddle was drafted as a
modified version of the original boy-girl paradox, how-
ever, with a subtly altered way of conveying information.
As we show in this article, the solution as presented in
Ref. [1], does not account for this point, and instead,
different rules are applied to different parts of the game
(for instance, a potential croak from the single frog is not
considered).
Here, we present a modified solution to overcome this
problem, finding, that the chance of survival varies be-
tween 1/2 and 1, depending on the probability of male
frogs to croak. Importantly, the same odds are obtained
in both directions (single or two frogs), such that any
of the two can be chosen, which is in contrast to the
strategy suggested in Ref. [1]. The possibility of multiple
croaking, and its statistical distribution, does not affect
the result.
We thank F. Keidel and C. De Beule for stimulating
discussions, as well as B. Mayer for bringing the frog
riddle to our attention.
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